Religious, political and geographical determinants of attitudes to Protestant parades in Northern Ireland

Introduction
Disputes over assertions of religious and cultural identities are very common in peace processes (e.g. Atashi 2009: 45-60; Lederach 1997, 23-36; Ramsbotham et al. 2011; 302-15) . Confrontations over territorial boundaries, clashes concerning historical and contemporary rights and disagreements over what constitutes equality or mutual respect, may all be juxtaposed with efforts to embed peace. Issues of parity of esteem and equal treatment of rival traditions may be particularly important in cases where a consociational political framework attempts to manage, but not necessarily resolve or remove, the religious and political divisions which gave rise to conflict (Finlay 2010; 89-102; McGarry and O'Leary 2004; 1-61; Requeqo and Nagel 2015; 1-11) .
As consociational peace processes and their attendant political outworking strive to ameliorate deep-rooted ethno-national or ethno-religious divisions, supposedly post-conflict societies may be sites of continuing local strife.
Given the possibility of shows of ethno-religious militancy destabilising a peace process, their statutory regulation, or even prohibition, may be deemed necessary by the state. In Northern Ireland, parades are the most common form of such identity displays, being used mainly, but not exclusively, by Protestants to mark out territorial boundaries and assert their religious and political (British Unionist) identity. These demonstrations of loyalty to the Protestant faith and the British Crown are regulated by a government-appointed body, the Parades Commission. This quasi-judicial body's decisions to permit or re-route controversial parades has resulted in rioting (from Protestants and Catholics) in more years than not since Northern Ireland's 1998 peace deal, the Good Friday Agreement.
Yet amid such controversy, there has been scant detailed work to date on rival attitudes towards these territorial markers. This article aims to redress this dearth of knowledge by providing the first quantitative examination of the key structural, political and spatial determinants of attitudes within Northern Ireland's Protestant-British-Unionist and Catholic-Irish-Nationalist traditions towards Protestant parades. In examining these determinants, the article seeks to discover the depth of inter-communal polarisation and intra-communal differences in attitudes on these strident and exclusivist expressions of religious, cultural and political affiliations. It draws upon recent data from the 2015 Northern Ireland General Election Survey 1 to examine public attitudes to one of the most visible polarising aspects of communal affiliation in a divided polity.
Understanding the depth of inter-and intra-communal division and its repositories is the first task of policy-makers in attempting to formulate policies to reduce ethnic rivalries.
The Protestant-Unionist/Loyalist-British and Catholic-Irish-Nationalist/Republican communities are not homogeneous entities, nor do they offer uniform views. We test which variables matter in explaining the degree of support, antipathy or ambivalence towards Orange marching rights. Are there significant intra-communal differences within the two main communities, in addition to the main inter-communal binary divide over Protestant parades? Do intra-communal divisions match onto political rivalries between the Unionist and Nationalist parties, or do demographic, religious or geographical (i.e. the proximity to parades) variables matter more? We examine the extent of inter-communal sectarian hostilities over parades; then explore the extent of uniformity or diversity of opinion within both communities and finally, assess the basis of intra-communal division. We begin, however, by briefly explaining the contemporary contextual background to sectarian hostilities over Protestant parades.
Background: Contested territory and the regulation of ethno-religious parades
Although offering a globally-admired peace process, Northern Ireland remains a site of contested boundaries and competing ethno-religious identities. Its consociational peace deal legitimises rival cultural, religious and political identities and little inter-communal thawing is evident. Educational and residential segregation between Protestants and Catholics remains extensive, whilst the ethno-religious chasm in terms of which political parties are supported remains huge. A plethora of regulatory commissions -on human rights, equality, victims, parades, and culture, identity and tradition -attempt to mitigate ethno-religious rivalries. Elitelevel cross-community power-sharing is accompanied by the aspiration that political cooperation will permeate the grassroots of rival communities. Pending such thawing however, regulation of inter-communal rivalry is undertaken via statutory commissions.
The starkest outworking of rivalries in Northern Ireland comes annually during the 'marching season' in spring and summer, when thousands of followers of the Orange Order, an exclusively Protestant religious and cultural organisation, take part in parades which are unpopular with the Catholic, Irish Nationalist population. Not all Protestant parades are organised by the Orange
Order, but the bulk come under its remit. Disputes over the routes and content of a small number of these religious and cultural expressions of identity have been common. Rioting has occurred on seven of the last ten years on the main marching day, the Twelfth of July, a violent manifestation of deep-rooted sectarian divisions. These disturbances followed adjudications on Porter (1996: 215) contends that for those from the Unionist tradition, Northern
Ireland is 'primarily the site of a Protestant-British way of life which alone warrants public institutional recognition'. Orange parades place this in public view. The Parades Commission has attracted the opprobrium of the Orange Order -the 'Charades Commission' is a popular derogatory label -and much criticism from Unionist politicians. In boycotting the Parades Commission, the Orange Order has also highlighted the unelected and unaccountable status of the regulatory body (Walsh 2015 The violence associated with a small number of parades has been condemned as hugely damaging and an abdication of the Orange Order's original religious mission according to one of its former chaplains (Kennaway 2006 ) and seen as counter-productive and naïve even by those sympathetic to benign parading traditions (Dudley Edwards 1999). The role of religion within the Order is widely perceived to be in decline, somewhat usurped by a 'rougher' parading tradition (Kaufmann 2007 ) and a more secular Loyalist working-class 'blood-and-thunder' urban band culture quite distinct from the more genteel Orange lodge parades in more rural areas (Bryan 2000; Smithey and Young 2010) . Austere, fundamentalist Protestants, whilst sharing
Orangeism's theological distaste for Roman Catholicism, have tended to eschew the Order, seeing its members as insufficiently religious, arguing that 'the principles of Orangeism are fine but the reality is often rioting drunks and attacks on the police' (Bruce 2007: 199) . This view may also be held by more liberal middle-class Protestants in addition to the religious hardcore.
Inter-and intra-communal differences on parading: testing hypotheses
Having outlined the nature, regulation and criticisms of the Protestant parading tradition, we now quantify the extent of division between the main political and religious communities, using the 2015 Northern Ireland General Election Survey. We focus on respondents' choice from three possible options on the most appropriate response to Orange Order parades: a) that they should be allowed to proceed past Nationalist areas without restriction b) that they should be allowed to proceed past mainly Nationalist areas only with agreement from local residents, or c) that they should not be allowed to proceed past mainly Nationalist areas. We begin with the basic overarching binary divisions: Protestant versus Catholic and Unionist versus Nationalist, whilst also showing the views of the 8 per cent of the survey who declared that they had no religion (the percentage identifying as holding a religion beyond Protestantism or Catholicism was below one per cent so those respondents are excluded) and the much more sizeable group (32 per cent of the survey) who do not identify as either Unionist or Nationalist. We also include views according to which political party is supported.
[ Table 1 about here]
As can be seen from whilst the majority of supporters of Nationalist parties desire a ban on any such parades near Nationalist areas.
Clearly, therefore, there are stark inter-communal differences between attitudes to Protestant parades and their regulation which are likely to remain difficult to resolve. Yet it can also be seen that there are not uniform views within both communities. A sizeable minority of Protestants are prepared to compromise on parades, wanting prior local agreement. Similarly, some Catholics will countenance Protestant parades adjacent to their areas provided there is local agreement. We need to establish the basis of internal communal differences between militancy and moderation.
As such, we now test which of the demographic, political and religious variables matter most overall in terms of the defence or rejection of Protestant parading rights. We also introduce a geographical component to our analysis.
Hypothesis 1 Religiously observant Protestants are less assertive of parading rights than their non-practising counterparts.
It may be that the Orange Order's religious mission has been displaced by a more secular or sectarian approach. A more strident and assertive Loyalist band culture may have replaced the quieter, more reverent approach of the Order, as it has been largely removed from political influence and forced to agitate for its demands. If this is true, then we expect that support for unrestricted -and potentially antagonistic -parading rights might be more forthcoming from irreligious, largely nominal Protestants who rarely practise their faith - Kaufmann's (2007) rougher parading tradition, at least as much anti-Catholic-Nationalist as pro-Protestant. We thus hypothesise that mammon outflanks God in providing the impetus to hardline attitudes to marches and expect the least religious Protestants to be most demanding of unfettered parading rights. whereas a very sizeable minority of SDLP supporters would be content to see local agreements.
As such, we expect to see independent party effects within the Nationalist bloc.
Hypothesis 6: Distance from Orange parades may have an effect -the furthest removed will be most likely to support compromise
Finally, as a more exploratory hypothesis, we also include a geographical location variable in our predictors of attitude to Orange Order parading. Increasingly, political science is including geographical indicators as part of explanations for political behaviour, and more recently, individual distance indicators in propensity to vote (Dyck and Gimpel 2005) 
Method
To test these hypotheses, we construct two binary logit models, one for Protestant respondents and the other for Catholics. We employ the question on attitudes to parading rights as our dependent variable. We code this with the more robust (and, to critics, sectarian) responses -the right to parade anywhere for Protestants, or the banning of Orange Order parades near Catholic nationalist districts -coded as the reference (0), with the response 'parade with agreements' combined with the very few respondents in the opposing radical response as the contrast (1).
We include and interpret standard controls for age and gender, age included at the interval level, These organisations nonetheless remain separate from the Orange Institution and it is attitudes to Orange parades with which we are concerned given the Order's assertion of marching rights and reluctance to negotiate with the regulatory commission. Table 2 presents the findings from the Protestant and Catholic models.
Analysis
[ Table 2 about here]
It is first worth noting the overall model fit. With four fewer degrees of freedom, the Catholic model explains twice as much variance -if we interpret the pseudo-R 2 in this manner -than the Protestant model. The variables specified in the model explain more of the variation in Catholic attitudes to Orange Order marches than differences among Protestants.
Perhaps more disconcertingly for policy-makers, a small age effect is present in the Catholic
community, but what it shows is that older respondents are more likely on average to support parades with agreements than younger respondents. As such, there is scant evidence of generational thawing, as younger Catholics are even less favourably disposed towards Orange parades near 'their' areas. Supporters of this approach might laud a refusal to accept marches seen as sectarian; critics will argue these anti-Orange attitudes are themselves sectarian.
Regarding our hypotheses, for Protestants, religiosity has an impact but not in the way we hypothesised., in that those who attend church more than once a month are more likely to support the Orange Order's right to march without restriction than those who practise less frequently.
Accordingly, any assumptions that it is a largely secular, irreligious and irreverent 'band culture' that is most vigorously asserting Orange parading rights need revision, as the cause of unrestricted Orange marching rights attracts much sympathy from those who are church-going Protestants.
The social class effects we hypothesised for are relatively restricted, with only the economically Order among Free Presbyterians is noteworthy in that, remarkably given their low overall numbers, they remain the largest single Protestant denomination within the DUP, although their representation is declining (Tonge et al. 2014) . Similarly, across the two models, those identifying still with their respective unionist or nationalist (sectarian?) labels will be less inclined to agreements on Orange parading than those not identifying with unionism or nationalism. Almost inevitably, members of the Orange Order are more strongly in favour of unrestricted parading than non-members.
However, our party support hypothesis is upheld only on the Nationalist side. UUP supporters and DUP supporters alike are sympathetic to the Orange Order's assertion of parading rights. parades to be permitted whatever route they please, whereas most Catholics desire a ban on all parades skirting Nationalist areas. However, the article has also demonstrated the existence of a sizeable minority within both communities in favour of the compromise of parading in 'contested' areas with local agreements.
We find differing attitudinal influences within each community and, whilst recognising the importance of the main binary divide, we argue it is also important not to treat the Protestant and Catholic communities as uniform, homogeneous entities. Among Protestants, attitudes towards parades are not conditioned particularly by social class, or party affiliation. Unionist ideological affiliation and Orange Order membership are predictably significant in the assertion of unfettered marching rights. The type of Protestant also matters, as being a Church of Ireland member is associated with moderation compared to other Protestant groups. For Catholics, whilst opposition to Orange parades is extensive, there are sizeable party cues, with supporters of Sinn Féin, a party with some history of opposition to certain Orange parades, most opposed.
Younger Catholics (and especially working-class ones) are also more in favour of an outright ban on Orange parades taking place adjacent to Nationalist areas, an indication to policy-makers that they cannot rely on generational change for this issue to become more amenable to compromise.
Finally, distance also matters. The closer Northern Ireland's citizens live to sites of Orange parades, the more divided are the two communities and Catholics living closest to such marches are the least amenable to their staging. As Protestant parades will not vanish anytime soon, much work close to sectarian interfaces among both ethno-religious bases is still required to diminish 
